Federal incentives for industrial modernization: Historical review and future opportunities by Batson, Robert G. & Coleman, Sandra C.




FEDERAL INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL MODERNIZATION: 
HISTORICAL REVIEW AND FUTURE OPPORTUNITIES 
Sandra C. Coleman 
AST Technical Manager 




. .  ?7 
Industrial Engineering Department 0 




i r  L; The University of Alabama a -. 
. .  
r.) 
--I 
P. 0. Box 6316 
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 
. 
August 1987 
Prepared for Submission to the IIE Journal 
The Engineering Economist 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19890016393 2020-03-20T01:22:58+00:00Z
ABSTRACT 
Concerns over the aging of the U . S .  aerospace industrial base led DOD 
to introduce first its Technology Modernization (Tech Mod) Program, and 
more recently the Industrial Modernization Incentive Program (IMIP). 
incentives include productivity shared savings rewards, contractor invest- 
ment protection to allow for amortization of plant and equipment, and 
subcontractor/vendor participation. The purpose of this paper is to review 
DOD IMIP and to evaluate whether a similar program is feasible for NASA and 
other non-DOD agencies. 
engineers because it provides a structured, disciplined approach to identi- 
fying productivity improvement opportunities and documenting their expected 
benefit. 
dating cost avoidance is needed. 
These 
The IMIP methodology is of interest to industrial 
. 
However, it is shown that more research on predicting and vali- 
i 
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I .  INTRODUCTION 
Industrial productivity has been defined as the ratio of valuable 
output to input, i.e., the efficiency and effectiveness with which re- 
sources -- personnel, machines, materials, facilities, capital and time -- 
are utilized to produce a valuable output [ l o ] .  A recent article [21] in 
Industrial Engineering cites that high among the reasons for lagging 
productivity in the U.S. are outdated, outmoded production methods being 
used in places where capital investment has been minimal. Almost 70% of 
equipment used in aerospace production is more than twenty years old [ 2 1 ] .  
The aerospace industrial base as utilized by the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) func- 
tions under a variety of inherent difficulties which impede productivity 
gains: (1) complexity of the product; (2) relatively low build rates; (3 )  
frequent changes in the basic product; and (4) substantial use of exotic 
materials and specialized subsystems, components, and parts. These dif- 
ficulties are further exacerbated by exterior forces on the government 
contractor by such things as (1) production re-scheduling and stretch-outs, 
(2 )  funding availabilities, (3 )  short-term contracting and financing, and 
(4) economic and environmental regulations. 
. 
To modernize a plant and improve productivity, the industrial engineer 
must ensure effective use of resources, integrate a unified and efficient 
effort, provide a baseline for performance evaluation, and prepare for 
future opportunities and r i s k s .  This  planning must encompass long range 
markets and rate of growth, medium range demand for product and capital 
facilities and short range sales, personnel space needs, and cash flow. 
Major capital investments must be planned, designed, and installed in 
advance of need. 
profit reasons of using the available but worn-out or unproductive capital 
equipment or facilities. Often in the aerospace industry, these facilities 
are government-owned. 
DOD capital expenditures to improve defense industry productivity 
Too often the decision on investment has been delayed for 
growth are described in [2 ]  by "policy solutions to incentivize corporate 
capital investments have been promulgated in two specific areas: 
changes to contractual policies relative to negotiated profit objectives 
and progress payment rates to increase the cash flow of defense contrac- 
tors; and (2) the provision of government "seed money'' as direct 
(1) 
1 
, . . .  
performance incentive payments to specific contractors to bring high 
technology industrial modernization to the factory floor." 
in this area by the U.S. Air Force were called Tech Mod (technology modern- 
ization). This concept matured into the DOD'B Industrial Modernization 
Incentive Program (IMIP), authorized on 2 November 1982 and referred to as 
"the cornerstone of DOD efforts to improve defense contractor productivity 
[12 ] . "  
Technology programs that preceded IMIP [81, in fact 132 projects were 
selected for detailed review. The purpose of this paper is to review IMIP 
as a DOD-funded program of quite recent origin and evaluate whether a 
similar program can be used by NASA and other non-DOD agencies. 
Early efforts 
The GAO has published an extensive review of DOD Manufacturing 
Historically, NASA and other non-DOD agencies have incentivized cost 
reduction through contracting modes that led to various rewards and sharing 
of cost-savings, based on performance. For this reason, a review of 
Federal government procurement practices is provided in Section 11. The 
DOD now has a track-record in applying IMIP, which we describe in Section 
111. 
Industrial Modernization Incentive Program (IMIP) on non-defense Federal 
government-funded prime and subcontractors projects will be assessed. The 
decision factors for implementation of IMIP will be identified and applied 
in an example. NASA IMIP explorations will be reviewed. 
In Section IV the feasibility of discrete application of a formal 
11. GOVERNMENT PROCUREMENT PRACTICES 
Government contacts are of two forms: (1) completion-end-product 
delivery in a specific time, and (2) tern-specified effort over designated 
time. 
tion, or lack of obligation to deliver specified end-products. 
ified work under a cost-reimbursement contract is not completed by the 
contractor within estimated cost, the contractor is nonetheless obligated 
The form of contract used reflects the contractor's legal obliga- 
"If spec- 
to continue his efforts to complete the work as long as the government is 
willing to fund the additional efforts [15 ] . "  
pletion arrangement, any funding required beyond the ceiling price rests 
Under a fixed-price com- 
entirely on the contractor. 
Term contracts are often used 
outcomes are difficult to forecast 
in early R&D efforts where technical 
and assurance of success is lacking. 
2 
Irrespective of actual accomplishment, the specified delivery of the 
level-of-effort completes the contract. Under term contracts, the govern- 
ment bears the risk of the contractor not wishing to continue; while under 
the completion form, the contractor must continue work till it is deemed 
complete." These two forms are often called "mission" type and "best- II 
efforts" type. 
are factors associated with determination of proper contracting form. 
Risk assessment and guidelines for profit/fee motivation 
The two family groups of contracts are (1) cost reimbursement and (2) 
fixed price. 
allocable, and reasonable costs including any overruns or growth. The 
government's procurement regulations stipulate the measures of cost allow- 
ability, allocability, and reasonableness. These cost type contracts allow 
the government great flexibility in contract direction within the contracts 
scope of work (SOW). 
government and less risk to the contractor. 
In cost reimbursement, the government must pay all allowable, 
This flexibility equates to additional cost to 
Fixed-price contracts establish a firm fixed price (ceiling) beyond 
which it is legally impossible to fund cost overruns or growth. Converse- 
ly, if the contractor underruns his cost estimates he pockets all the 
savings. Thus, a strong cost incentive is placed on the contractor and 
less on quality or on-time deliveries. 
are considered for procurements where design is firm, cost estimates are 
reliably certain, and schedules are easily attainable. 
Therefore, the fixed price contract 
A. Contractor Risk 
The two families (cost and fixed price) of contracts are further 
divided into specific types of contracts which delineate the government's 
responsibility to pay the costs incurred by the contractor. At one end of 
the responsibility/risk spectrum is the firm fixed price which provides a 
ceiling price that is not subject to adjustment for actual cost variances 
experienced by the contractor. 
(profit) is a fixed amount and costs are reimbursed at actual. 
these extremes, the contract types provide for responsibilities/risks 
depending on degree of technical uncertainties. Figure 1 contrasts and 
illustrates the factors used in selection of the appropriate contract. 
At the other end the contractor's fee 
Within 
This figure contrasts only the major selections of contract arrange- 
ments which are commonly used between the government and its aerospace 
industry contractors, subcontractors, and vendors. The customary 
3 
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contractual use of the profitlfee concept illustrates the strongest dis- 
tinction between costs-reimbursement contracts (CPFF, CPIF, & CPAF) Involve 
a fee, whereas fixed-price contracts (FPI & FFP) involve a profit. 
illustrate the relationship of contract cost outcome and the profit/fee 
Impact of each basic contract, the graphs of Figure 2 are provided. 
To 
B. Contractor Motivation to Modernize 
Several economic factors are considered by any contractor who is 
Under CPFF contemplating a productivity improvement in his facility. 
contracts, the contractor may feel incentivized t o  underrun cost and affect 
a higher fee relationship (rate) for his fixed fee. The CPFF arrangement 
might encourage a contractor to "load up" on non-essential or idle facil- 
ities to give stability to his work force. Another problem is the possi- 
bility of a contractor overrunning direct cost to absorb fixed charges and 
overhead. 
The CPAF contract provides greater flexibility in deferral of cost of 
performance objectives specification but is often criticized for the 
arbitrary subjective evaluation of a contractor's efforts. 
the award fee evaluation criteria, the distinction between a contractor's 
inputs (such as personnel attrition, training, neatness, and administrative 
practices) and delivered outputs (such as test data, facilities construct- 
ed, and test completed) is often overlooked. The contractor may be overly 
motivated to respond to acceptable "inputs" rather than accomplish the 
c o n t r a c t  scope output o b j e c t i v e s .  
In designing 
Under CPIF contracts, the risk associated with cost, schedule, and 
performance objectives are systematically shared between parties of the 
contract. Multiple incentive arrangements are encompassed in most "share- 
lines" of fee. 
emphasis on the penalty-reward considerations for cost, performance, and 
schedule, Thus, these sharing structures communicate the optimal trade- 
offs among these objectives. 
These arrangements are so structured to place appropriate 
In Stimson and Reeve's February 1984 Industrial Engineering article 
[18]  "Industrial Engineering Challenges in the Defense Industries," one of 
several problems cited in the incentivization for factory modernizations 
was the inhibiting effect on progress on productivity by the cost-based 
profit policy of DOD. 
productivity in that when DOD negotiates cost and profits, fee is typically 
This policy in certain circumstances penalizes 
4 
permitted based on a cost relationship. 
see profits reduced as a result of efforts to improve productivity and 
accordingly reduce cost. 
Thus, a contractor may actually 
The fixed price contracting environment is for those contracts when 
there is little or no uncertainties associated with cost, performance, or 
schedule. 
incentive effectiveness is structured around cost outcomes which will vary 
little from the negotiated cost estimates. 
contractor, a higher target profit is provided. Under FFP contract, the 
contractors reduction of cost reverts to increase in profit while the 
government does not share in savings. 
The FPI arrangement applies a ceiling price and the range of 
Due to higher risk on the 
.C. Subcontractors and Vendors 
When a prime deals with its subcontractors, these second and third 
tiers of vendors and suppliers are typically contracted on a firm fixed 
price basis. These FFP contracts provide the components, assemblies, and 
parts that the prime aerospace contractor will modify, combine, assemble, 
and test as an end-product. Often these parts and components will be 
off-the-shelf hardware or "modified" standard catalog items. In this 
arena, price may be a market response, a competitive bid, or a standard 
quote with very little relationship to operations unit cost -- essentially 
"what the market will bear." 
The government relies on competition and an "open" marketplace to 
assure a favorable and reasonable price. The interrelationship of the 
subcontractor and the prime contractor under FFP is generally the same 
circumstances described earlier of the relationship of the prime with the 
government. The government will usually maintain some degree of control of 
subcontracting by the approval process under the prime's declared and 
approved "make or buy" policy. Individual major subcontracts must go 
through an award approval process between the prime contractor and the 
government. In the FFP environment, little if any government surveillance 
or administration is available on operations cost and performance measure- 
ment. This factor complicates any assessment of operation for shared 
shavings in the IMIP program parameters. The General Accounting Office 
(GAO) has cited this as "needed guidance" to improve DOD efforts to imple- 
ment IMIP at subcontractors and vendors, stating that mechanisms are needed 
for analyzing benefits and investments at these contractual levels [19] .  
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111. IMIP PROGRAM HISTORY 
A. Background 
In an October 1984 IMIP Technical Review, RADM J. S. Sansone, Deputy 
Chief of Naval Material, presented "The Challenge: 
trial Advantage Through Productivity and Technology [16]. "This review 
gives a broad overview of the issues, concerns, and results of the IMIP 
Program to date. 
the following disturbing conditions: an eroding defense industrial base, 
limited surge mobilization capability, capital investment in defense 
segment low, productivity growth very limited, Defense Acquisition Regu- 
lation (76-23)/profit policy not motivating contractors to make substantial 
capital investments, and general misunderstanding of DOD finance policy and 
cost principles. 
Requiring the Indus- 
According to this review, research studies have verified 
At the same time, industry's concerns have grown in the areas of high 
overhead costs, excess capacity, low labor productivity, high inventory and 
material costs, quality assurance, poor sales forecasts, delivering new 
products on time, and yield problems. If these concerns are not solved a 
company cannot compete and may choose to abandon the government market- 
place. All of these concerns affect a company's productivity. According 
to [16], influences which act contrary to modernization efforts in the DOD 
marketplace have been: government provided plant and equipment, much of 
which is outdated; cyclical nature of defense demand; annual fundings of 
contracts; short term-thinking; and cost based profit policy. 
B. IMIP Definition and Procedures 
In Figure 3, the IMIP influence and baseline adjustments on a program 
are charted. The profit strategy of IMIP incorporates good profit margin 
management with management of asset turnover improvements to facilitate a 
sound percentage return on assets and investments. The IMIP promises to 
make quality, reliable hardware systems more affordable, while continually 
motivating industry through shared savings rewards to be more productive. 
Admiral Sansone [16] estimates the DOD results to date with projected new 
contractor productivity enhancing capital investments at $1.3 billion and 
projected savings to be shared at $4.0 billion. 
In the 1984 DOD Guide, "Industrial Modernization Incentives Program 
(IMIP)" [4], two problems have been cited most frequently as inhibiting 
6 
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productivity modernization progress. 
hinder investment amortization and inhibit long-term planning. 
is cost-based-profit policy. 
eliminated long-term benefits of investment in modernization. The problem 
is that profits (cost savings/avoidances) do not increase in the short-run 
while costs (capital invested) increase significantly because capital must 
be invested "up-front" of expected benefits. Figure 4 (from [SI) displays 
the nature of this "up-front" example of cost reduction. 
First is program uncertainties which 
The other 
The low price negotiation concept may have 
The IMIP is a very targeted and controlled method of encouraging 
capital investment in productivity. 
negotiated under the IMIP, the DOD must be able to recognize the prospect 
of reduced costs and other benefits which have cost reduction potential. 
Baseman [ l ]  emphasizes "when more than one DOD Component is doing business 
with an IMIP contractor, one DOD Component will be assigned the lead and 
will consolidate the other DOD Component requirements." 
Prior to any business arrangement 
C. Strategy and Assessment of Benefit 
Other authors [e.g., 171 have recognized that government and industry 
approach modernization incentives/programs from different perspectives. 
From the government's perspective, three prerequisites for an effective 
IMIP application are multi-year procurement, economic production rates, and 
encouragement of competition. Program stability is vital to program 
efficiency and productivity improvements. Production rate economies are 
essential to efficient utilization of facilities. A contractor must not 
receive an unfair competitive advantage via incentives to modernize and 
maintain his manufacturing facility. 
Other factors relating to the government's comprehensive program 
acquisition strategy, which should influence the government's decision to 
begin IMIP project planning, are listed below [from [SI): 
1. Realistic budgeting 
2. Improved support and readiness 
3. Termination protection for purposes other than IMIP 
4. Second-sourcing plans 
5, 
6, Spare parts acquisition 
7, Profit policies 
Manufacturing and producibility engineering planning 
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8. Interaction with other incentives, such as: 
a. Incentive-type contracts 
b. Value engineering 
c. Design-to-cost 
d. Reliability and maintainability incentives 
These considerations must be made to assure plans and techniques are 
compatible with project strategy and goals and relationships with IMIP 
incentives are well defined. IMIP should not be confused with efforts to 
upgrade a manufacturing process in a contractor's facility with direct 
costing against available government funding. Such efforts have been 
criticized [I71 as promoting "piecemeal, bottoms up" modernization result- 
ing in "islands of technology," with "little consideration for their 
integration into total or parallel systems." 
application with contractor investment, 
IMIP is usually a plant-wide 
Companies with aggressive productivity programs will gain the most 
from IMIP as it overcomes many of DOD's contracting barriers to productiv- 
ity enhancement. If IMIP is incorporated into a company's internal produc- 
tivity program, only a minimum additional effort is required to effectively 
use the IMIP. Furthermore, IMIP methodology [4] forces the industrial 
engineer assigned to identify productivity improvements to follow a dis- 
ciplined approach for: 
1. Factory analysis - Identifying productivity enhancement oppor- 
tunities. 
2. Benefit prediction - Benefits on opportunities to be exploited. 
3. Benefit verification - Verifying actual benefits received versus 
predictions. 
In examining its productivity enhancement activities, a company must 
look to those activities of the overall business objectives and its current 
capital investment plans, For IMIP purposes, there are two classifications 
of capital investment; those made without the influence of IMIP incentives 
and those with. The first class encompasses investments made to remain 
currently competitive, to achieve baseline program objectives, to enter new 
markets and to earn an attractive return on investment (ROI). IMIP is not 
meant to subsidize, substitute, or replace these outlays, 
The second class of investments with IMIP shared savings incentives 
are for those where an attractive return is not present and where risk due 
to program uncertainties is at an unacceptable level. According to the DOD 
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IMIP Guide [4], "The contractor's share of the savings is that share 
necessary to make the investment an attractive business opportunity and is 
calculated using the discounted cash flow model . . . for capital invest- 
ments and a percentage share of savings when the implemented improvements 
are not capital intensive.'' 
reduced to a computer program which is defined and utilized later in this 
section. 
The discounted cash flow (DCF) model has been 
The level of capital investment with IMIP incentives will be a strate- 
gic financial decision for the company. 
provide acceptable rate of return and investment recovery and make a 
commitment of the increased level of capital expenditure. 
commitment, the company should initiate discussions with the DOD and 
provide broad plans with simple estimates of cost and benefits. Each 
cognizant service in DOD, as well as NASA, will probably vary in approach 
and application. A contractor must recognize these distinctions and 
differences in policy, resolution, and implementation by these agencies. 
It must decide that IMIP can 
After such a 
For early understandings with the DOD, a memorandum, which satisfies 
IMIP guidelines but is not a contractual commitment, should provide: 
1. The contractor's past, present, and future productivity enhance- 
ment program (both content and dollars) without the IMIP incen- 
t ives . 
The contractor's increases in productivity enhancement effort if 
IMIP incentives are provided. 
2. 
3 .  The expected benefits of the enhancement effort. 
4. The company's projected sales base over the proposed IMIP par- 
ticipation period, including the major DOD programs. 
A formal contract arrangement with the company will include approval 
of productivity projects, contract incentives, IMIP statement of work, and 
obligation of direct funding, if any, for the government. 
D. Prime/Subcontractor Relationships Under IMIP 
The subcontractor/vendor base represents a substantial part of most 
major aerospace program costs, often 50% t o  60% of cost. At this tier of 
subcontractors, the DOD's "multi-services" and NASA are often interlinked. 
As such, this subtier base offers potential, significant benefits for IMIP 
initiatives. The subcontractor IMIP involvement may be (1) direct govern- 




of the industrial base. 
the subtler base of a given major system program. 
The IMIP strategy In this case may be an "industry" approach or 
The "industry" approach targets a specif ic sector 
The "programmatic" approach attempts to modernize 
The prime contractor may administer the subtler program for the 
government by formal program office management. 
provide management, control, financial incentives, and technology assis- 
tance necessary to stimulate vendors implementation of capital equipment 
investment. 
direct government program. 
and ensures the best interest of the government are being upheld. 
actions taken are still subject to the review and final approval of the 
government. 
Its objectives would be to 
Basic management of a subcontract is handled the same way as a 
The prime contractor represents the government 
All 
In the financial investment analysis of the "costs" and "benefits" of 
an IMIP proposal, several steps are involved: 
1. Define the baseline for comparison and expected savings. Analy- 
sis requires identification of cost and price if IMIP project was 
not adopted. There must be agreement on production quantities 
and schedules. 
2.  Identify the necessary investment. Specific items, installation, 
engineering, and time-phased acquisition costs must be developed. 
3 .  Develop a cost and pricing schedule for the proposal. The 
realistic time-phased expectation of the implementation will 
influence the depreciation, the imputed cost of capital, and 
facilities-related profit. 
4. Analyze the financial effects -- This step needs a Discounted 
Cash Flow (DCF) analysis of relevant financial forces. 
E. Difficulty in Validating Cost Savings 
Cost and benefits of an IMIP application should be reviewed a minimum 
of three times: economic analysis stage, pre-implementation, and post- 
implementation. A detailed analysis, usually involving a work breakdown 
analysis of the process for producing an item, must be performed in order 
t o  calculate the cost savings at a level which clearly segregates the 
effects of the change in the manufacturing environment [ 5 ] .  The GAO [ Z O ]  
has criticized the DOD and recommended "Better estimates of the savings 
resulting from IMIP efforts are needed in order to establish program 
10 
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cost-effectivenese." 
techniques was true for prime contractors as well as administration of 
subcontractors. 
This comment on estimates and on better validation 
F. F-16 Early Results, Trade, and Projections 
On the F-16 program, 60% of the cost represents procurement dollars 
with subcontractors. In 1984, twenty subcontractors have started moderni- 
zation programs and have yielded real results -- more than $550 million in 
DOD savings committed. According to General Dynamics (GD), ninety subcon- 
tractors/suppliers are planned for involvement. 
use an authorized cost-benefit approach and methodology which assumes a 
preliminary cost savings analysis in Phase I, a refined analysis in Phase 
11, and implementation in Phase 111. A typical analysis plan and activ- 
ities in this methodology is displaying in Figure 5 from [9]. 
The subcontractors must 
The savings on the in-plant GD Tech Mod (IMIP) have been very drama- 
tic. 
ment at $11M and development effort at $14M) in early 1977 was the fore- 
runner to the Tech Mod program where GD agreed to invest $100M in new 
facilities to affect 1388 F-16 aircraft. With follow-on contracts, the 
total F-16 flight units anticipated are 2144 USAF and 75 Peace Marble 
aircraft. 
thirty-eight In-plant projects and productivity improvements which have 
been Implemented [22]. 
The initial USAF commitment of $25M (contractor research and develop- 
This extremely long production run will have benefited from the 
For a dramatic comparison, the original savings, the validated savings 
and 1985 savings forecast by GD are shown in Figure 6. It shows saving 
validated to be 50% greater than estimates in the first seven years. 
G. F-16 Goals Attained and New Horizons 
The vehicle learning curve experience has been 78% on manufacturing 
direct labor hours [22]. 
aircraft production over this extended period. This fact correlates with a 
drop in hours per unit frhn 110,000 in 1977 to 26,000 hours today. 
savings relate to lead-time reduction from months to days. 
basics of IMIP, the ROI at GD is averaging 12-182 [ l l ] .  
The USAF considers this a phenomenal rate for 
These 
Inherent to the 
As reported by USAF and GD, the current initiatives include: 
1. Program expansion to %on-touch," non-factory labor efficiencies 





5 .  
Increase participants and lower tiers of subcontractors. 
Additional technical support to assist subcontractors in their 
initial efforts. 
Cost management projects at prime and subcontractor to tailor 
current cost accounting system to meet automation of the manufac- 
turing environment. 
Creation of computer data bases for enhanced collection, analy- 
sis, and dissemination of programmatic, financial, and technical 
data to government and industry. 
In the General Dynamics brochure [23] on the F-16 (1985), the USAF 
F-16 Industrial Modernization Program Office Manager is quoted, "For every 
dollar of savings generated, 80 cents flow to other products and programs. 
For every government dollar of seed funding provided, industry has commit- 
ted six additional dollars of capital investment and ten dollars of savings 
to government." He expects to save $1 billion by 1993 in the total produc- 
tion of the F-16 fighter [ l l ] .  By any standard of measure, the F-16 IMIP 
initiative has been highly successful. 
. 
IV. EVALUATION OF FEASIBILITY OF 
NON-DOD IMIP APPLICATIONS 
We now describe a methodology [ 1 4 ]  that could be utilized by program 
managers in the Federal government or industrial engineering management at 
a contractor to evaluate the feasibility of a particular IMIP application, 
assuming groundrules identical to those used by DOD. The financial attrac- 
tiveness of a proposal is determined by comparing cost required with the 
benefit expected. The contractor's net cash flow for an analysis of an 
investment proposal consists of: 
1. Outflows 
a. Contractor facilities investment expenditures. 
b. Contractor income taxes from higher income less investment 




a. Imputed cost of money -- based on net book value of 
incentivized facility investment. 
Depreciation on the proposed investment. b. 
c. Net change in profit (increase or decrease) -- represents 
the net effect on profit/fee component of price, i.e., 
profit on depreciation, profit on facilities capital 
consideration, and any "lost profit" due to reduced 
contractor effort. 
d. Productivity Saving Reward (PSR) -- formal shared savings 
which is the incentive of IMIP to produce an adequate 
contractor IRR on investment. 
A. Analytical Model 
Analysis of this type is straightforward when a computer program does 
the computation and keeps track of the agreed-upon items. 
timates to be developed are these: 
The cost es- 
1. The year-by-year investment-related costs (outlays, depreciation 
accounting practice, relevant profit rates). 
2. Other effects of productivity-enhancing investment (lower labor 
costs, out-of-pocket cost of production). 
A "business as usual" case with no IMIP-related agreement (ini- 
tial expected return for contractor and benefit to government 
without any sharings). 




5. If disagreements arise, the rate of return may be computed with 
alternative inputs to highlight the disagreement variances. 
The DOD IMIP Steering Group approved [3] the Discounted Cash Flow 
(DCF) Model, developed and maintained by the Logistics Management Insti- 
tute, for use as a tool in negotiating IMIP Tech Mod business agreements. 
Figure 7 is taken from the USAF policy issued pursuant to the DOD IMIP 
Guide and outlines the steps and items in the computer model. Figure 8 
gives a line by line description of each line in the DCF Model [24]. 
A spread-sheet financial analysis program can handle a return on 
investment (ROI) model and calculate the internal rates of return (IRR) for 
a stream of year-by-year net cash flows. In the following sub-section of 
13 
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this paper, a DCF model is developed and employed to evaluate a potential 
NASA initiative. 
An IMIP proposal is based on the expectation of reduced costs and 
The validation of the effects of IMIP effort is important 
It 
shared savings. 
to the assurance and long term credibility of the program application. 
is necessary early in the IMIP process to focus on the benefits analysis 
and verification of the validated process requirements. The system may 
vary from minimal (evident reduction) to extensive and is dependent on the 
types of incentives used. The DOD Benefit Analysis is charted on Figure 9 
from [24]. 
B. Example Application 
A cash flow computer program, as shown in Figure 10, addresses all the 
elements of the DOD IMIP program model. 
tions are made as follows, reflected in the model input screen (Figure 11). 
A tooling complex costing $40 million is assumed for capital venture. Cost 
Accounting Standard (CAS) 409 depreciation is computed on a 5-year sum-of- 
the-years digits method with an assumption of acquisition by mid-year. 
Investment tax credit (ITC) and accelerated cost recovery system (ACRS) 
depreciation assumes the pre-1987 tax regulations. CAS 414 cost of money 
utilizes the current Treasury Department interest rate on borrowed money. 
Savings and profit are variable inputs and assumptions based on a forecast 
of savings inherent in the tooling installation. 
In this example, several assump- 
With these set of inputs, the DCF model computes a net savings of 
$48.062M to NASA and $36.938M to the contractor, as shown in Figure 12. 
This is based on an assumed total savings of $85.OM which is a direct 
input. 
the contractor due to a lower base. Therefore, the true savings to the 
contractor is $26.738M ($36.938M - $10.200M). 
on a 19% return on investment, which is a negotiating criteria. Share line 
percents would be adjusted as negotiation strategy dictates. 
Of the $85.OM savings, $10,20OM is attributable to profit loss to 
This saving split is based 
C. NASA IMIP Explorations 
Since the early 1 9 6 0 ' ~ ~  the role of NASA's George C. Marshall Space 
Flight Center (MSFC) has primarily been the design, development, test, and 
launch of various multi-project, multi-contractor propulsion systems. 
of NASA's aerospace contractors use their own plants with government 
Most 
14 
furnished tooling and have other contracts with one of the DOD tri- 
services. In some instances, the contractors utilized a government-owned 
facility and produced a single project item, i.e. NASA's Michoud Assembly 
Facility in New Orleans where Boeing and Chrysler built the Apollo Pro- 
gram's S-IC and S-IB stages and where Martin-Marietta builds the Space 
Shuttle's External Tank. In most cases, the government has provided 
facilities and equipment rent-free, 
With the onset (1973) of the Space Shuttle Program, the use of expend- 
able hardware from short production runs (often one-of-a-kind) gave way to 
the repetitive production required of such items as the External Tank and 
the Solid Rocket Boosters. 
bility for IMIP-like programs at NASA-MSFC. 
system contracts that MSFC manages on the Space Shuttle Program are given 
at the bottom of Figure 13. 
This repetitive production opened the possi- 
The four major propulsion 
. 
These contracts are for ten or more years, valued at $5OOM to $1500M, 
and utilize incentives for cost control and improvement. Generally, each 
of the programs of the Shuttle era have a non-recurring CPAF type of 
contract environment with the recurring operational costs in a CPIF mode. 
Prior to the Challenger accident, the trend in contracting for the projects 
nearing a stable production status was the FPI mode. Due to weaknesses 
highlighted in the Challenger investigation, the emphasis has reverted to 
the development mode of CPAF. This mode enables the NASA management a 
subjective unilateral use of profit measurement and motivation of a con- 
tractor. The effect of this return to development mode and CPAF con- 
tracting relegates IMIP opportunities to a secondary priority until the 
Shuttle returns to flight status, Nevertheless, it I s  likely that with the 
return to Shuttle launches in mid-1988 and subsequent increases in the 
launch rate to accommodate defense and Space Station projects, that the 
opportunity for IMIP applications will once again emerge similar to the 
explorations reported below. 
The Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) prime contractor, Morton-Thiokol, Inc. 
(MTI), I s  the only NASA contractor which has explored IMIP opportunities. 
MTI IMIP efforts are traced back to March 1984 when a new tactical motor 
plant and equipment were formally brought on-line and installed through 
IMIP efforts of the U.S. Navy [13]. In November 1984, MTI initiated a 
complete analysis of all Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) operations at the Wasatch 
Division. The work breakdown structure was used as the framework for this 
15 
study. 
and potential improvement were identified. 
Over 200 potential projects were identified and evaluated. 
All major cost drivers within the WBS were analyzed, zero-based, 
The study 
and evaluation technique considered feasibility, potential savings, invest- 
ment cost, lead time for implementation, verification, or qualification 
requirements and other factors. 
subprojects were selected as suitable for near term implementation and were 
included in the SRM Buy I11 Proposal (60 flight sets) which was withdrawn 
after the Challenger accident. 
From the potential project list, 71 
NASA has encouraged MTI to extend IMIP opportunities to its subcon- 
tractors. 
SRM subcontractors to help them understand the concepts and mechanics of 
IMIP. Over the next s i x  months, seven possible candidate subcontractors 
responded with preliminary potential projects or process enhancements. 
contractor made site visits and assessed the subcontractor's degree of 
commitment and scope of projects. 
In March 1985, orientations and presentations were given twenty 
. 
The 
Several issues were raised which fortify the early problems inherent 
in procurement with government systems contractors. 
program instability equate to level of production concerns and commitments. 
Industry's concern for confidentiality of its cost information bears on the 
very competitive nature of some market places and suppliers. The danger of 
favoring one competitive supplier over another risks protests in court. 
All of these subcontract candidates were in the very early planning stage 
at the time of the Challenger accident, developing their initial capital 
investment plans and abilities. Significant interests in IMIP exist when 
program long range stability and production demand are present. 
suppliers' concerns are for production rate, technical acceptability and 
fair competition, Once these concerns are resolved, the joint NASA- 
contractor decision to implement IMIP must be based upon cost recovery, 
rate of return and risk protection. 




The DOD has been long concerned that the U.S. aerospace industry was 
not prepared for either short-term surge conditions nor long-term mobili- 
zation. Furthermore, defense contractors (similar to most heavy industry 
in the U.S.) are using out-moded facilities and tooling and therefore are 
not as productive as they could be if they modernized. Capital investment 
planning for long-range operations has been circumvented at these contrac- 
tor plants by short-term profit strategies and myopic fiscal planning. 
IMIP was created by DOD to solicit capital investment commitments from 
progressive firms for the purpose of providing savings to both parties in 
defense contracts through productivity improvements. These incentivized 
improvements have proven especially successful for General Dynamics and its 
subcontractors on the F-16 program. 
It has been a government policy not to put one firm in a more competi- 
tive posture than another. In fact, competitive forces themselves lead to 
some modernization efforts. 
encourage production readiness improvement. 
has served as the primary motivator for Federal contractors to implement 
productivity improvements. 
Direct cost funding by agencies such as NASA 
The CPIF mode of contracting 
Assuming an ideal opportunity is shown to exist at a prime contractor 
facility or its vendors, IMIP can be readily employed in the first two 
phases, i.e., analysis and project plan. A performance measurement base- 
line, purged of others acquisition factors such as quantity changes, 
engineering changes, and learning curve effects must be developed [ 7 ] .  The 
major drawback, which has been recognized by GAO, is the process to vali- 
date savings predicted by contrasting a "before-IMIP baseline" with "after 
IMIP." 
level of detail and distinction between learning, changes, and enhance- 
ments. A system of cost accounting and control to afford this level of 
substantiation could be complex, ponderous, and extremely costly to manage, 
unless properly designed. 
CPIF performance evaluation on an interim (prior t o  completion) basis. 
There is a clear opportunity for engineering economy researchers to con- 
tribute improved methods to predict and validate cost savings due to 
modernization, and for contractor industrial engineers t o  apply these in 
the IMIP-type arrangements with the Federal government. 
Most firm's accounting systems are unable to reflect this precise 
To a lesser degree, this problem is inherent in 
17 
Unless a contractor is heavily committed to work under Federal con- 
tract to the exclusion of other work, modernization efforts will be more 
influenced by commercial opportunities. Industry management has been 
supportive of the IMIP concept, even though they are unanimous in their 
preference for an improved tax structure and the stability of multi-year 
procurement as better ways to incentivize modernization. IMIP's role is 
not to replace these preferred incentives, but rather to provide a justi- 
fication for long-term investment in facilities and tooling which out- 
weights any consideration of short-term R O I  financial criteria. Thus, the 
government's desire for productive use of its contract dollars can be 
realized by appealing to the "strategic" or long-term profit desires of the 
contractors [ l a ] .  
18 
c ? .  
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Figure 7 Diecounted Caeh Flow (DCP) Model 
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1984 1985 1986 
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C u m u l r t i v o  t o t a l  0.0 0.0 0.0 
2 Comcrrccor t a p r r a r r  0.0 0.0 0.0 
Cumulr t  i v o  T o t a l  0.0 0.0 0.0 
3 DoD/Crvrrr~rrc r U B d i D 8  0.0 0.0 0.0 
C u ~ u l r t i v r  t o t a l  0 :o 0.0 0.0 
4 S r v i m 8 r  A v r i l r b l o  t o  D o 0  0.0 0.0 0.0 
CUDU Lit i v o  Total  0.0 0.0 0.0 
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5s  R ~ A D ~ 8 6 , 8 6 , 1 0 0 , 1 1 , 1 . 0 ~ . 0 ~ ~ ~ l . ~  FOR 1. TO 10. 
56 READ(89,89,120,11,1.01.,0001.) FOR 1. TO 10. 
57 R E A D ( 9 O , 9 O , l 2 l , l l , l . , I . , 0 . , 1 . )  FOR 1. TO 10. 
58 R & A D ~ ~ l , 9 1 0 1 4 ~ 0 1 1 , 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 . 0 1 ~ ~  FOR 1. TO 10. 
59 READ(92,92,160,11,1.01.,0.01.) FOR 1. TO 10. 
60 R E ~ D ~ 9 ~ 0 ~ ~ 0 2 ~ ~ 0 1 1 0 1 . 0 1 . 0 0 ~ ~ l . ~  FOR 1. TO 10. 
61 R&AD~94,94,360,11,1.01.00D01~~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
62 R € A P ( 9 ~ , 9 ~ , ~ ~ o , ~ ~ , ~ . 0 ~ . 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ . )  FOR 1. TO 10. 
63, ~~AD~96,96,505,11,1.01.00.01.~ FOR 1. T0.10. 
75 - 1.0 .......... 75 76 COLUMN RANGE 
76 = 5.0 . 
77 = 4S.O , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T H I S  1s U S E D  AS A LABEL. 
78 .I 84. ............... MESSAGE 
8 1 FORMSCREEN ( 23 . ) 
83 ' F I  = LEFT F 5 . m  R I G H T  F13 * S A V E  DATA Fll - EXIT' 
84 'YEAR 1 YEAR 2 YEAR 3 YEAR 4 YEAR 5 '  
85 'YEAR 6 YEAR 7 YEAR 8 YEAR 9 YEAR 10' 
90 INPUT('1NVESTMENT TAX CRE ',' ',9.01r08.01.,25.) FOR 75 TO 76 
91 INPUT('DEPREC1ATION CAS409 " '  '~10.~l.08.,l.025.) FOR 7s TO 76 
92 INPUT('C0ST OF MONEY CAS414 ',' '011.01.06.01.025.) FOR 75 TO 76 
93 INPUT('CONTRACT0R EXPENSES ', ' ' 012.01.08.,1.025.) FOR 75 TO 76 
94 INPUT('SAV1NGS AVAIL-YR W/P ' ' '  ' 013001.06.01.025.) FOR 75 TO 76 
96 INPUT('ACRS D E P ~ I C I A T I O N  ',' '015*01.08.01.,25.) FOR 7s TO 76 
110 MESSAGE(83,20.,22.,55.) 
111 HESSAG€('78',5.,28.,45.) 
115 IF(l13COLl. EQ 11.1 GOTO 132 
116 IF(113COLl. EQ 4.O)GOTO 75 
117 ZF(ll3COLl'. EQ 5.)(75*6. FOR 1.;76=10. FOR 1.;78=85.;77*50.; GOTO 8 0 )  
118 IF(113COLl. EQ 13.1COTO 121 
I19 GOTO '77' 
121 PORMSCREEN(0.) ;FORMSCREEN(l8.) 
122 MESSAGE('SAVING DATA - PLEASE WAIT - ',4.,20.,40.,9.) ' 
80 FORMSCREEN(O. 1 
0 ~ 7 ~ ~ 1 * ~ 8 * ~ ~ ~ , 2 5 . )  F O R - 7 5  TO 76 
0 ',8.01.06.01.,25.) FOR 7s TO 76 
0 "  
88  INPUT('EXPCND1TURES @ D  
89 INPUT('CAPITAL~ZATION 
9s INPUWPROPIT I N  SAVINGS-YR ~014.01.0e.01.02s.~ FOR 75 TO 76 
1 1 3  READSCREEN(I.) 
. . . e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ o ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
123 WRITE~88088,100011,1.,l.00.01.~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
124 WR1TE(89,89,120,11,1.~l.00.01.) FOR 1. TO 10. 
125 WRITE~90,~0,121,11,1.01.,0~01~~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
126 WRITE~91,91,140,11,1.01.,0.,1.~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
128 WR1T&~93,93,220,11,1.,1.,0.,1.~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
129 WR1T~~94,94,360,11,1.,1.,0.,1.~ FOR 1. TO 10. 
130 WRIT&~9509S037001101.01.D~.,l.) FOR 1. TO 10. 
131 WRITE(960960S0S011,1.,l.,0.,l~) FOR 1. TO 10. 
127 WR1TE(92,92~160,11~1.~1o~O~,lo) FOR 1. TO 10. 
............. ........................*.* 
A32 RETURNPLOGIC us1 /SRBIMIPMENU.IL CALC') 
A33 'END' 
Figure 11 DCF Input Screen for Example Application 
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